International Trade of Isolated Countries: The Case of Myanmar and North Korea by JINHWAN OH
1
Distortions of Sanctions on Myanmar’s Trade: Evidences and 
Predictions from the Gravity model
Chapter 1
Introduction
The  collapse of  the socialist system i n 1988 by the university students’ democracy 
protests was expected to be the critical turning point of Myanmar’s economy. Government’s 
suppression to the protests, however, greatly induced the international pressure on Myanmar. 
Immediately,  Japan, Germany, and  the  United  States,  three major  aid  providers, ceased 
development assistance underthe reason of human right abuses by Myanmar government. In the 
meantime, newmilitary government, looked forward to a modern developing country, intr oduced 
the market oriented economic system and enacted Foreign Investment Law in November 1988.
Although the economy achieved some significant progress, the vulnerable political conditions 
between the opposition group and the military government triggered additional sanctions from 
the US and European governments year by year. Although the sanctions are regarded to punish 
the military government, the most affected group is only the average population.
The response of the new military government to the serious shortage of foreign currency 
due to the international aid ban was straightforward; exploiting and selling all of its natural 
resources to neighboring countries became the main source of foreign earning. In additi on, the 
hostile international  measures  has  been  an o bstacle  for  the  US  and  European investors, 
deepening stagnation of the Myanmar economy. As a result, the ties with neighboring countries2
strengthen which lead Myanmar to heavily rely on disproportionate trade pattern with Thailand
and China who exploit natural resources of Myanmar unconditionally. Over the two decades, the 
combination of inefficient macroeconomic policies, impact of Asian financial crisis, and trade 
and investment sanctions greatly pushed Myanmar to be the impoverished country of the modern 
world.
The pattern and role of Myanmar trade, therefore, becomes an interesting question for 
achieving its economic take-off. A comprehensive structure of the Myanmar’s economy and its 
comparative  advantages  should be  expected  to  relocate  its trade  flows to  non-neighboring
developed and developing countries. In the release of the US trade and investment sanctions,
specific composition of imports and exports would be channeled to the US, in the expectation of 
transferring high technology and touching the large US markets. Consequently, Myanmar’s trade 
pattern could shift from highly resource-based to manufactured exports under which existing 
factors of production can be utilized efficiently. Moreover, the trade str ucture of the ASEAN 
countries  might have a significant change by the diversifications of Myanmar’s  trade  in the
international  markets. In addition,  if  Myanmar  could  maintain ODA (Official  Development 
Assistance) from the US, the degree of exploiting Myanmar’s natural resources could be reduced
tosome extent.
Since no studies have been done regarding the impact of sanctions on Myanmar’s trade,
this study investigates the distortions of sanctions on Myanmar’s trade pattern. Firstly, wh ether 
Myanmar follows ASEAN trade pattern or not is analyzed. To do this, a simple econometric 
model is created by recognizing that ASEAN countries might have a particular trade structure 
since they all have a similar situation determined by location, endowment and access to foreign 3
markets. The estimated model reflects the ASEAN’s trade pattern in terms of volume and partner 
composition; the situation which Myanmar should have. Then, whether Myanmar is far from that 
benchmark or not can be elaborated. Secondly, in what extent of Myanmar trade is  dis torted 
compared withthat of its neighbors can be measured. Finally, under the free trade condition, how 
much of  its trade  volume could diverge to  the  US  and  other countries is simulated using 
predicti ons of the model for the 1994-1998, 1999-2003, and 2004-2008 periods.
The simple well-known econometric approach, the gravity model, is used in this study. A 
reduced-form equation in which the link between the volume of ex ports and imports to the level
of countries’ economic development and their distance is  applied, including other influential
variables such as free trade area and vicinity. It is the successful model in the sense that it can 
explain most of the variations in bilateral trade, and the estimated effects are economically and 
statistically  reliable  across  studies  although  theoretical  foundations  of  this  model  are not 
rigorous.
This  study  constitutes six parts. Chapter  2  presents Myanmar’s major economic  and 
social indicators for some selected years, types and status of sanctions, and trade compositions.
Literature review is  di scussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 represents the applied econometric model, 
its  limitations and the data organization. In  C hapter  5, the  estimation  results are  discussed
followed by the simulation test for Myanmar’s predicted trade and actual trade levels, using 
ASEAN trade patterns estimated by the model for three time periods. The conclusion is in the 
Chapter 6.4
Chapter 2
Myanmar’s stages of economic, social, trade compositions and sanctions
Myanmar was actually an “early starter” of economic development in Southeast Asia.
John Wong(1997)
Director of the Institute of East Asian Political Economy, Singapore.
US sanctions have not had any success in fostering greater democracy or improving the human rights 
situation in Myanmar. In fact, conditions worsened.
John J. Brandon (1999)
Asia Foundation
It may surprise some of the recent era that Myanmar was a leading economy in the South 
East Asia  region  and  the  world’s  top  rice exporter  until  the  early  1940s
1.  Possessing  well-
educated elite along with the rich and diverse natural resources such as timber, oil and precious 
stones, Myanmar had been regarded to be the most promising economy in the region after its 
independence in 1948. Not surprisingly, per capita income of Myanmar in 1950 was higher than 
that of Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand
2.  Four decades  later,  under the socialist 
regime, Myanmar became the least developed country status in 1987. After the collapse of the 
socialist  system,  the economy  achieved  some  progress  in  the  early  1990s;  however,  the 
vulnerable political conditions posed trade and investment sanctions from the Western countries. 
Needless to say, political mismanagement and poor economic strategies delayed its development 
for more than half of a century.
                                                                           
1 Mya Than (1992)
2 John Wong (1997)5
After  independence,  overemphasizing  industrialization  to  the  relative  neglect  of  
agriculture combined with domestic insurgency encountered the sl ow rate of economic growth. 
Under the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, after the military government took power in 1962, more 
determined to import-substitution industrialization and be as self-reliant, neglected to tap ODA 
or bilateral external assistance. During this period, Myanmar lost her position of the world first 
rice exporter. In order to entitle concessional foreign aid and a rescheduling of its external debt 
payments, in 1987, Myanmar was granted to be the least developed country status. The growth 
rate declined to -11.4 percent in 1988 mostly due to political upheavals in the country.
In spite of the introduction of open market economy and Foreign Investment Law in 
1988, there were no considerable changes in terms of the economic and development vision. 
Also, there has been little change in the structure of the economy for more than  two decades. 
Although government spending is not emphasized to stimulate the economy, government fiscal 
deficits are assumed to account for a large percent of GDP for every year
3 and these deficits are 
mostly financed by printing money. Kubo (2007) showed that the monetization of fiscal deficits 
causes chronic inflation. Moreover, Myanmar’s domestic currency interest rate is determined by 
its Central Bank and has been unchanged until 2008 in the range of 10 to 12 percent; thereby it 
cannot contribute  the market  economy. Some  economic indicators  are described  in Table  1. 
However, it is important to note that Myanmar’s statistics cannot be fully relied to interpret the 
reality of its economy and people.
                                                                           
3 For some year, data on government expenditure and budget are not published.6
Table 1. Major economic indicators for some selected years
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008
GDP (%) 2.55 3.59 -0.38 6.43 12.72 13.6 13.9 11.9
GDP Per Capita (%) -4.03 3.81 10.66 13.6 10.8 11
Exports
Imports
Trade balance -492 -823 464 1547 2266 3010
Current Account Balance -527 -436 -9.4 444 1032 1803
Inflations 11.8 27.42 23.68 10.7 26.3 32.9
Total external debt 4673 5534 6114 6863 7303 7404
Foreign exchange reserve
Foreign Direct Investment 308.2 179.8
Sources: Asia Development Outlook, Statistical Year Books and Myat Thein, Economic Development of Myanmar 
(2001)
Under the socialist era, Myanmar could be said to be the country which met its basic 
needs
4.  Per capita GDP was US$ 220 in 1987; people were relatively equal in terms of income 
and access to education and health care. After two decades, it can be assumed that the quality of 
life for average population has no improvement; particularly the economic hardship of a large 
number of people is becoming more obvious. GDP per capita in 2008 is about US$479, which is 
only 2.5 percent of the per capita income of South Korea and 12 percent of that of Thailand. 
                                                                           
4 Mya Than (1984)7
Recentl y, Myanmar’s Human Development Index (HDI) rank is 132 out of 169 countries placing 
Myanmar below the regional average.
Table 2. Major social indicators for some selected years
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008
Population (million) 22.2 n.a 34.8 40.8 49.13 54.3 55.4 56.52 57.5
Adult literacy (%) 60 71 70 78.6 89.8 89.8 89.8 89.8 89.8
Life expectancy at birth (years) 44 52.5 57.5 58.9 59.9 60.6 60.08 61.2 61.6
Infant mortality rate (per 1000) 129 n.a 101 120 107 101 n.a 103 98
HDI (Human Development 
Index) n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.58 0.406 0.419 0.432 0.438
Sources: UNDP, Statistical  Year  Book,  2004  and  2008,  and  Myat  Thein,  Economic  Development  of  M yanmar 
(2001)
Until 1950s Myanmar enjoyed trade surplus as a result of colonial ties. After the closed-
door policy  was activated under the socialist  regime,  foreign trade became only  a marginal 
activity in Myanmar. Foreign reserves reached the lowest level which was less than one month to 
import requirements in 1987. In the 1990s, there was a hope for Myanmar to exploit the dynamic 
comparative  advantage  of  international  trade.  Ho wever,  in  the  absence  of  political  and 
macroeconomic stability, international transactions cannot survive longer in the country.
The  numerous  regulations  on  foreign  exchange  and  trade  in  Myanmar  lead  to  the 
existence of informal exchange rates and economic activities. The official rate has been set up at 
around 6 kyat per U.S. dollar for more than two decades; which is pegged to the special drawing 
right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All export earnings of private sectors 8
must be deposited at state-ow ned banks. Private importers are not only shut off from official 
foreign reserves but also prohibited to import if they do not have any exporting earnings; which 
result  in t he  emergence  of  unofficial  parallel  exchange  rates.  Therefore,  market  clearing 
exchange rates have depreciated around 1,185 kyat per US dollar in 2008.
Recentl y, Thailand, China, India and ASEAN are the largest trading partners. Myanmar’s 
major  import  compri ses  consumer  goods  and  capital  goods, mostly  machinery,  transport 
equipments, and refined mineral oil. Major exports are natural gas and oil, wood products, pulses 
and beans, fish, rice, clothing, and gems. The current account deficits have been dissolved by 
natural gas revenue since 2002; however, under the government monopoly of gas exploration, 
this current account balance cannot bring an improvement for the economy. Regarding partner 
composition, it can be observed from the following table that Myanmar is increasingly trading 
with the Asian countries.
Table 3. Trade partner composition from 1960 to 2008 (%)
1980s 1990s 2000s 2005s 2006 2007 2008
EX IM EX IM EX IM EX IM EX IM EX IM EX IM
AS EAN 27 8 21 12 21 44 42 46 53 47 50 45 57 51
EU 13 21 9 24 11 7 13 3 7 3 7 4 4 2
CHINA 9 4 11 7 14 26 7 29 6 36 9 35 10 32
INDIA 1 1 3 0 12 1 11 3 15 4 15 3 12 3
JAPAN 10 44 8 35 7 8 4 4 5 3 6 4 4 3
US 0 5 1 5 12 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
REST 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: EIU, Statistical Year Books, Mya Than, Myanmar’s External Trade (1992) and Myat Thein, Economic 
Development of Myanmar (2001)
Government’s suppression to the democracy protests in 1988 was the starting point of 
international pressure on Myanmar. Japan, Germany, and the United States immediately ceased 9
ODA under the grounds that Myanmar government was violating basic human rights. The series 
of demonstrations since 1996 to the demand for justice, and handlings of the government to these 
actions have triggered different types of sanctions again and again. 2003 import sanctions by the 
US  created  negative impacts much  more on  the unskilled  working force,  especially  young 
women.  Because of  these trade and  investment sanctions, young people are  moving abroad 
which leads Myanmar  to be t he lack of  active  labor  force.  Recently, the number of  illegal 
migrant  workers  from Myanmar  to neighboring Thailand  is  i ncr edibly increasing. By taking 
advantage of sanctions on Myanmar, Thailand, China, and India have attempted to replace the 
trade and investment positions of the Western countries.
Major types and status of sanctions, and net ODA can be seen in Appendix. Unlike the 
US, Japan  who  accounted  fo r  almost  80  percent  of  Myanmar’s  ODA,  frequently  releases 
humanitarian assistance to Myanmar but maintains ban on new aids
5. At the present, in spite of 
propose for sanctions along the 1990s, the pro-democracy groups are getting interested in lifting 
the sanctions for political and economic reasons. Nevertheless, the US strongly asserted that they 
will not lift the sanctions unless the Myanmar government takes the action on their core concern 
of events inside Myanmar
6. At the mo ment, Myanmar has favorable preconditions for take-off 
such as natural resources, trading possibilities, and the potential Democracy from 2010 election. 
However, Myanmar’spolitical stability is still posing the questions for its economic growth.
                                                                           
5 New York Times, 26 June 2003.
6 Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary for East Asia.10
Chapter 3
Literature Review
The gravity model has consistently proved to be a versatile tool in social sciences for 
more  than  forty years.  It can explain  the economic  interactions  between different  locations 
especially in the study of trade volumes, capital flows, and labor migration by considering their 
distance from each other (Tinbergen, 1962; Voorhees, 1956; and William, 1929). The concept of 
the  gravity  model  is  simply  derived  from  Isaac  Newton’s  Law  of  universal  gravitation. 
Intuitively, trade between countries is similar to the gravitational interaction between planets; the 
attraction force (total trade) is determined positively by their relative masses (economic size) and 
negatively by the distance between them (the transport cost). These initial specifications and the 
estimate of  the  determinants of trade  flows are  introduced by  two seminal papers of  Dutch 
economists,  Tinbergen  (1962)  and  Pö yhönen  (1963);  however, there  is no sound  theoretical 
background. Since then, the basic gravity model has been augmented by other economic factors 
such as the effect of trade agreements, common currency, and dissimilar factor endowments; and 
non-economic factors such as regional and cultural similarities, common institutions, common 
language, political factors, and other policy variables.
Despite the lack of a convincing micro-economic foundation, gravity models maintain its 
success since they  have  outperformed  more sophi sticated  models i n the estimations  of  trade 
flows. Some ambiguity, however, regarding its theoretical foundations motivated investigations 
into the original ad hoc specification. Many efforts have been made to confirm the connection 
between  the  model  and trade  theories.  The  earliest  theoretical  models,  Linneman  (1966), 
described that the gravity equation is matched with a reduced-form equation in which a partial 11
equilibrium  mo del  of  export  supply  and  import demand  is  derived.  Anderson  (1979)  and 
Bergstrand  (1985)  develop  mo re  rigorous general  equilibrium  mo dels to derive  the gravity 
equation; however, some restrictive assumptions are required, such as identical preferences and 
production functions, perfect substitutability of goods in production and consumption, perfect 
arbitrage, and constant transportation costs. L ater, a gravity equation has been derived from a 
general equilibrium model in which technological assumptions are relaxed and externalities are 
considered,Asilis and Rivera-Batiz (1994).
The  trade  flow  of  developing  countries,  mostly  inter-industry  trade  with  perfect 
competition, which is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model of homogeneous goods 
can be explained  by the gravity  model,  Hummels and  Levinsohn  (1995),  Deardorff (1998), 
Evenett and Keller (2002). Deardorff (1984) found that the gravity model can also explain intra-
industry trade which cannot be  accommodated  itself  by the  conventional  factor endowment 
theory. Moreover, the results that the gravity model is more consistent with the differentiated 
product model with high shares of intra-industry trade under increasing returns and monopolistic 
competition is shown by Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Bergstrand (1985, 
1989). Feenstra et al. (2001), however, shows that the derivation of the gravity equations from 
both differentiated and homogeneous goods lead to different estimation in key parameter values 
thereby these gravity equations pose different trade policy implications.
Among the applications of the gravity model, Montenegro and Soto (1996) investigated 
the degree of distortion by the  US embargo on  the  Cuban trade structure  and predicted  its 
evolution under the free trade condition. The trade flows between 101 countries in the 1980-91 
period is used to explore the distortion of trade. They found that 80 percent of Cuban exports and 12
imports  would  be  ex pected to  direct  towards  the  USA  from  Canada and  Japan  to  reduce 
transportation and transaction costs.
Regarding  sanctions  on  Myanmar,  Howse  and  Ge nser  (2008)  analyzed  the 
European Union’s sanction which can be regarded as a limited and targeted sanctions. They tried 
to argue that the additional trade sanctions against Myanmar by the EU could not violate the 
provision of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) that prohibit trade sanctions. 
Referring the WTO provisions  and cases, they  concluded  that expending  the mild  sanctions 
could  violate the  WTO  rules;  however,  these  trade-restrictive  measures  could  be  justified 
compatible with the Article XX (a) exception as “necessary to protect public morals,” under the 
ground on Myanmar military government human right abuse.
Relatively few studies have been done for Myanmar’s international trade. Nu Nu 
Lwin (2009) analyzed the trade patterns of CLM (Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) countries 
applying the gravity model from 1998 to 2007. She found that CLM’s trade patterns are mainly 
affected by partner country’s GDP, the difference between per capita GDPs of two countries, 
distances, common border, and presence in particular FTA. She considered trade sanctions as 
one  dummy  variable which showed  the significant negative  effect  on  bilateral  trade  flows 
between  Myanmar  and  the sanctioned  countries.  This study emphasizes the  distor tion  of 
Myanmar’s trade by the US and European sanctions; which can be expected as a fulfillment to 
the requirements ofthe studies on Myanmar’s economic welfare.13
Chapter 4
Methodology and Data
To estimate the pattern of ASEAN’s trade, this study follows the standard gravity model 
in which trade between two countries can be modeled as in equation (1), where i represents the 
reporter country and j corresponds to the partner country,Montenegro and Soto (1996):
                                        Mi
j, Xi




ij)                                                           (1)
where Mi
j is non-fuel imports of the reporter i from partner j, and Xi
j represents non-feul exports 
of the reporter i to partner j. Trade potentials (TP
i, TP
j) can be explained by the size of the 
economy  (e.g.  GDP),  its  degree of development (e.g.  per  capita  income)  and  population or 
physical area. In addition to transport costs (TC
ij), specific factors (SF
ij) can be considered to 
affect bilateral trade volumes; such as either a reporter or a partner being a member in special 
trade areas, or being a landlocked, and neighbors to each other.
The econometric equation of augmented gravity model in this study is as follows:
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where GDP and PGDP are the annual GDP and per capita GDP of the partner country in US 
dollar; Distance is the distance between ASEANand partner countries in nautical miles which is 
a proxy of transport cost. Linder is the absolute difference of per capita GDPs in US dollar 
between ASEAN and partner countries; countries with similar level of per capita income are 14
produci ng  and  consuming si milar  goods,  thus trade between them  is  much  mo re than trade 
between  those  whose  economies  differ  in  size  and  structure, Linder  (1961).  ASEAN, 
Landlocked, and  Border  are dummy  variables taking value  1  if the partner  is  a member of 
ASEAN, a landlocked, and sharing a common border with the reporter.
Regarding the signs of the coefficient to the variables, a positive sign is expected in GDP 
as trade will  increase with GDP of the partner countries; this sign is also expected in trade 
agreements  (ASEAN) and vicinity (Border)  as  well.  On  the coefficient of  per  capita  GDP, 
Bergstrand (1989; as cited in Montenegro and Soto, 1996)  suggests that signs are ambiguous: 
exporter per capita GDP should have a positive (negative) effect if the trade composition is 
capita  (labor)  intensive  in  production.  Importer’s  per  capita  GDP  should  have a  positive 
(negative) effect if the trade composition is on luxury (necessity) goods in consumption. Since 
ASEAN has a relative abundance of labor and a lower consumption pattern compared to most 
market economies, the sign of per capita GDP is expected to be negative. Similarly, a negative 
distance parameter is expected in the sense that transportation costs always indicate the adverse 
effect.
According to Linder, if countries trade more when their economies differ, their trade is 
based on comparative advantage, if so a positive sign in Linder is expected. By contrast, while 
countries trade more when their economies are si milar, their trade is based on differentiated 
products; a negative sign is expected. As ASEAN’s trade is mostl y determined by comparative 
advantage, the sign should be positive. In the landlocked case, si ngs can be positive or negative; 
it depends on whether ASEAN countries are trading with landlocked countries or not.15
The default regression method is  the Tobit model. However, the ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimators with robust standard errors, random effects and fixed effects estimators (since 
the data sets are panel) are obtained for comparison among regressions. In fact OLS techniques 
are inappropriate in the case when zero values are common in bilateral trade data. Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) raised concerns about the biasness and the problems caused by the zero values 
of the dependent variables. Left-censoring problems arise by using OLS thereby parameters are 
inconsistent  if  the  dependent  variable  is  censored.  So me  researchers  utilize  alternative 
procedures, such as simply eliminate zeros in the dependent variable (e.g. Brada and Mendez, 
1985) or replace them by arbitrary small values (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003 and Butt, 2008; 
as cited in Orgilbold 2010), which also tend to bias the results. Us ing fixed effects may drop 
some important variables, and random effects have the same problems like OLS.
Thus, in order to control for left-censoring problem,the Tobit model is employed both in 
the estimation procedure and for the simulation test. Using Tobit model has another advantage 
that a maximum likelihood technique creates completely reliable parameters, even for the small 
sample size (Sen and Matuszewski,  1991).  In  this study,  large samples  (between  1,275 and 
10,200 observations) save the significance of the regression estimations. In addition, logarithmic 
specifications in all variables except dummy variables are applied
7, which also explains a direct 
measure of the elasticities, Sanso et al. (1993). One-year lagged variables for export and import 
are also taken in order to avoid endogenity problem between GDP and trade.
Although the gravity model is successful in some senses, researchers acknowledge that 
because of the weak theoretical foundation, the interpretation of the results may be less precise
                                                                           
7 Firstly, zero value are changed to 1 and then taken log value. Thus these zero values do not necessarily change to 
undefined values when taking log form.16
than  one’s  ex pectation. Moreover,  this  si mple  gravity  model  may  ignore  some  potential
influential factors such as countries’ natural resources endowment. At the data level, physical 
distance can represent only how far they are, and not the accurate trading distances between 
countries as noted by Geraci and Prewo (1977), and Balassa and Noland (1988).
This study  uses panel data of  bilateral  trade  flows  between  eight ASEAN countries 
(reporters) and their 85 main trading partners covering 15 years from 1994 to 2008. The trade 
data come from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) of IMF in US million dollars (current 
values). GDP and per capita GDP in US dollars (current prices) have been obtained from the 
World Economic  Outlook  Database  2010 of  IMF.  The transportation distances,  grate-circle 
distances  between  eight  ASEAN  countries  and  their  trading  partners,  are  obtained  from 
timeanddate.com. For some cases, instead of using capital cities simply, the nearest ports of 
partner countries from ASEAN countries are chosen
8. ASEAN, landlocked and border dummy 
variables are from Wikipedia.com. There are three main data sets applied in this study, overall
data  sets  with  Myanmar and  without  Myanmar,  and  se parate data  sets  for eight  ASEAN 
countries. The reason for using the data set without Myanmar is to elaborate the simulation test 
for Myanmar’s trade pattern.
                                                                           
8 If one port city has smaller distance than capital city, but difference is small, the capital city is simply used. In 
Vietnam case two ports are used for taking distances: Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi since the distance itself between 
these cities is over 600 nautical miles. Thus Ho Chi Minh City is used as a starting point for Southern countries of 
Vietnam and Hanoi for Northern countries of  it.17
Chapter 5
5.1 Empirical Results
In the estimation process with a total of 85 partners for each country, Singapore and 
Brunei are excluded as countries with special circumstances usually distort the trade patterns. 
Presuming the effects of different fundamentals, exports and imports are estimated separately 
instead of total trade with every partner. Since this study deals with panel data, all the results 
from the pooled OLS with robust, random effects and fixed effects, and Tobit regressions are 
displayed. Particularly, the default regression is the Tobit method which proves the benchmark 
results. There are three main regression results: 1) ASEAN’s estimated pattern of exports and 
imports excluding Myanmar (each regression has 8,925 observations) and including Myanmar 
(each  regression  has 10,200 observations);  2)  three  periods  (five-year each) estimations  of 
ASEAN’s exports and imports without Myanmar (2,975 observations) and with Myanmar (3,400
observations);  and  3)  separate  regressions  for  each  of  eight  ASEAN  countries  (1,275 
observations for each). Lists of eight ASEAN countries and 85 partners are in Appendix.
The estimated regressions for exports and imports of seven ASEAN countries for fifteen 
years data are presented in Table 4. In general (Tobit), all parameters have expected signs at the 
conventional levels of significant. Apart from distance coefficient, all estimated values of other 
variables  in  both  exports  and  imports  regressions  are  similar  in  magnitudes.  Presumably, 
ASEAN countries trade is increased by the GDP of their partner countries. The sign of the per 18
Table 4. Regression Results on AS EAN’s exports and imports with overall data excluding Myanmar
OLS Model
Panel – Fixed Effect 
Model
Panel – Random 
Effect Model
Tobit Model
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports







































































































































8743 8739 8743 8739 8743 8739 8743 8739
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 %  level respectively.
Numbers in [ ] are t-statistics and z-statistics.19
capita GDP is as expected; a negative parameter implies that ASEAN’s trade compositions is 
labor intensive in production and necessities goods in consumption, suggested by Bergstrand 
(1989). The  positive sign  of  the  Linder  confirms that  ASEAN’s  trade  is  determined  by 
comparative advantage and a different composition of goods when they trade with the countries 
of different economic sizes.
The large absolute value of the coefficient of distance on imports than that of exports 
explains that  ASEAN countries can  minimize  the costs of  exports  under  the  export-oriented 
strategies. The large parameter value of ASEAN dummy also indicates that trade agreement 
among ASEAN is the important determinant of the intra-regional trade. According to the positive 
sign of  the  landlocked, ASEAN countries are  trading  with  landlocked countries  as  most of 
ASEAN are on  the  mainland  of  the  South  East  Asia.  Parameter  of  border  confirms the 
regularities that they tend to trade among themselves more than the rest of the world. However, 
there is a surprising result that the border coefficient becomes smaller and less significant in 
exports and not significant at all in imports when Myanmar is included in the estimation as 
shown in Table 5. The reason might come from the fact that trade between Myanmar and its 
neighbors, Bangladesh and Lao PDR, are relatively small
9.
                                                                           
9 No trade volume with Lao PDR is found during the period of study. Myanmar government frequently closes the 
border gates and trade with Thailand, Bangladesh, and China due to refugee crises.20
Table 5. Regression Results on AS EAN’s exports and imports with overall data including Myanmar
OLS Model
Panel – Fixed Effect 
Model
Panel – Random 
Effect Model
Tobit Model
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports







































































































































9973 9899 9973 9899 9973 9899 9973 9899
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 %  level respectively.
Numbers in [ ] are t-statistics and z-statistics.21
Table 6provides the estimated Tobit regressions of exports and imports of seven ASEAN 
countries for three periods (1994-98, 1999-2003, and 2004-08). The estimations of the three 
period models are basically similar to that of the overall model in terms of the signs, showing 
that ASEAN  countries  trade pattern  was not affected by  1997 Asian financial  crisis.  Some 
parameters become insignificant and these non-si gnificances reflect the minor fluctuations of the 
trade pattern along time periods.
The  fluctuated  nature of  the coefficient values of per capita  GDP  cannot  capture  the 
industrialization of the ASEAN countries in  the sense that if ASEAN’s industrialization level 
becomes higher, the parameter values of  trading  with  the developed countries (PGDP)  must 
become smaller with the negative signs along the periods. The transportation costs of ASEAN’s
exports are reducing but the opposite case is in imports confirming that they are maintaining the 
export-oriented strategies in three-period models. The coefficients of ASEAN dummy is getting 
larger in magnitudes in the second and third periods at the highly significant level; which is the 
result of the membership of Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia into ASEAN after 1997.
For the time being, ASEAN countries tend to trade less with the landlocked countries 
according  to  three  periods  values  of  landlocked  parameters.  Though  it  is  s tatistically 
insignificant, border  coefficient has large differences  in absolute  terms among three  periods, 
reflecting the situation of intra-regional trade instability by the border crises between Thailand 
and  three  countries  (M alaysia,  Cambodia,  and  Myanmar)
10.  By  including  Myanmar  in  the 
estimations as shown in Table 7, the distinctive finding is that ASEAN dummy for imports in 
                                                                           
10 Thai-Cambodian border crisis began in 2008. A major clash occurred in 2001 between Myanmar and Thailand.
Since 2001, an  ethnic insurgency is taking place in southern Thailand, the border provinces with Malaysia. Those 
crises can be regarded as the source of distortions of trade between these countries.22
third period becomes  relatively  large  indicating  that  Myanmar is heavily  dependent on the 
imports from ASEAN rather than other developed countries of the World.
Table 6.  Three Periods Regression Results on ASEAN’s exports and imports with overall data excluding 
Myanmar, Tobit Model
Period1 (1994-1998) Period2 (1999-2003) Period3 (2004-2008)
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports

































































































Number of observations 2869 2869 2934 2930 2940 2940
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 %  level respectively.
Numbers in [ ] are t-statistics.23
Table 7.  Three Periods Regression Results on ASEAN’s exports and imports with overall data including 
Myanmar, Tobit Model
Period1 (1994-1998) Period2 (1999-2003) Period3 (2004-2008)
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports

































































































Number of observations 3269 3241 3349 3323 3355 3335
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 %  level respectively.
Numbers in [ ] are t-statistics.24
To observe the different trade patterns among eight ASEA N countries, Tobit regressions 
of each country for fifteen years are run and presented in Table 8. Generally, all countries are 
common  in  signs  of  GDP  and  distance  variables.  Regarding  per  capita  GDP,  Indonesia, 
Thailand,  and Myanmar have  the  negative signs implying that they  are  mostly trading  with 
countries of similar economic size; however, the opposite case reflects in Cambodia, Laos and 
Philippines along with the positive signs. Malaysia and Vietnam are slightly different from the 
formers; they have negative signs in exports and positive signs in  imports indicating that they 
tend to export to developed countries and import from developing countries.
In the case of Linder, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand have the 
positive signs showing that their trades are based on comparative advantage. Cambodia and Laos 
have the negative signs implying that they are trading similar goods with the countries of equal 
economic sizes; Vietnam has a negative sing in exports only. Distance variables are estimated 
with relatively large coefficients forMyanmar, Cambodia and Laos reflecting that their trading 
costs are higher than other ASEAN c ountries’ costs (trade  concentrates on nearer partners).
Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are strong in the intra-regional trade as their 
ASEAN dummy is positive; Indonesia has negative sign but the absolute value is small and non-
significant. Malaysia and Myanmar’s exports to regional countries are negative, meaning that 
they  tend  to export non-ASEA N  countries; however,  Myanmar’s  import  from  ASEAN  is 
significant and large which is consistent with the previous finding in overall regression.
Island countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines rarely trade with the landlocked 
countries as their landlocked signs are negative and quite significant. In the presence of border 
crisis, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia have negative signs in border parameters.  The fact 25
that Laos is  only the landlocked country of ASEAN is proved by the gravity model with the 
largest parameter value of its border dummy. Since Philippines is island country, the border 
variable is dropped automatically. In overall, trade patterns of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand  have much  in  common;  Cambodia and  Laos  are  similar;  and Myanmar  and 
Vietnam are separately different from these two groups.26
Table 8. Regression Results on eight ASEAN countries’ exports and imports, Tobit Model
Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports





















































































































































































































































1232 1232 1256 1256 1238 1237 1255 1255 1230 1160 1254 1254 1254 1252 1254
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Numbers in[] are t-statistics.27
5.2 Simulation Results
To  simulate  the  trade  volume  of  Myanmar  with  its p otential  partners  under  the 
liberalization of  trade,  the  estimated parameters  from  three periods  regressions presented  in 
Table 6 are used. The predicted exports and imports for selected regional blocks and individual 
countries are shown in Table 9. As expected, the most important result of the simulation is that 
exports and imports share of the US are si gnificantly increased in the free trade; in response to 
the large domestic demand of US and the level of industrialization of Myanmar. This is the most 
desirable result that Myanmar should have as a long-run trade pattern after the sanction is lifted. 
Surprisingly, the predictions say that there is also a large increase in trade share of Japan in the 
free trade condition, although Myanmar is not imposed trade sanction by Japan. The criticism 
and responses of Japan on Myanmar’s political mismanagement might be the reason for lower 
actual trade volume.
The increase i n the share of the USA and Japan, which become more powerful trade 
partners, will replace the shares of Myanmar’s neighboring countries, including Thailand, India, 
and ASEAN which reduce their participation to a range between 8 to 40 percent of total trade. 
The US and Japan  are good examples of the role of industrialization in trade patterns; since by 
economic sizes and degrees of industrialization they greatly differ from the ASEAN and India, 
much of the expansion in their shares will contribute to the  higher stage of industrialization in 
Myanmar. It is worth noting, however, that this result is conditional for the heterogeneous goods 
(capital  goods  for  industrialization);  under  homogeneous  goods, it  is  possible  that  close 
substitutes might offset large transportation costs.28
Table 9. Myanmar: actual and predicted structure of trade (%)
Trade Partner Predicted Actual Level Predicted Actual Level
Exports (1994-1998) Im ports (1994-1998)
ASEAN(excluding Thailand)   2.4   9.5   1.1 17.7
EU 19.5 11.0 12.7   7.4
SAARC(excluding INDIA)   0.2   2.7   0.1   0.3
CHINA   4.4 11.0   6.8 25.1
INDIA   1.3 15.7   1.6   1.7
JAPAN 25.9   9.0 30.9   8.4
THAILAND 11.6   1.4 21.5   4.4
USA 21.6 11.2 17.8   1.1
Rest of the World 13.1 28.5   7.5 33.9
Total 100 100 100 100
Exports (1999-2003) Im ports (1999-2003)
ASEAN(excluding Thailand) 3.2   4.6             1.6        11.5
EU           12.0 16.6             6.8 3.7
SAARC(excluding INDIA) 0.1    1.7             0.1 0.2
CHINA 9.3    5.9           12.0        24.8
INDIA 1.5 11.5             1.5 2.4
JAPAN           17.4    5.1           31.0 6.6
THAILAND             9.7 26.8           11.6        16.5
USA           40.0 17.0           31.2 0.5
Rest of the World             6.8 10.8             4.2        33.8
Total 100 100 100 100
Exports (2004-2008) Im ports (2004-2008)
ASEAN(excluding Thailand) 1.8 4.8 1.7 9.7
EU 6.9 8.2 5.7 3.3
SAARC(excluding INDIA) 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.2
CHINA           33.1 7.7            27.1        32.6
INDIA 2.7        14.5 1.5 3.5
JAPAN 7.3 5.4            15.0 3.2
THAILAND 6.9        50.6 18.9        21.0
USA           38.0 2.4 27.0 0.2
Restof the World 3.3 4.4   3.1        26.3
Total 100 100 100 10029
Another significant prediction is that Myanmar’s export to China can increase taking 
advantage of the growing domestic demand of China. On the other hand, predictions of the trade 
shares of EU show no distinctive results particularly; it is c onsistent with the assertion that their 
sanctions are limited and targeted sanctions.  Of course, EU sanctions are directing only to the 
military  government such  as  visa bans on senior military  officials  and bans  on purchase of 
military equipments.
The prediction results are impressive and desirable; however, the reordering of trade is 
also important for other ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries. Not only exports of Myanmar to 
the US, Japan, and China should increase at the expenses of the reshuffling of exports from other 
developing  countries; but also Myanmar  imports  from ASEAN, China, and Thailand should 
decrease to around 8, 5, and 2 percent respectively.
All in all, the trade structure of other ASEAN countries can be posed a threat by the 
diversifications of Myanmar’s trade. In the event that Myanmar was released from the trade 
sanctions  and barriers  in  international  markets, and  since  Myanmar  is  possessing similar 
comparative advantages with ASEAN countries; the major exports (rice, rubber, natural gas, and 
other consumer goods) of ASEAN would face increased competition and the exporters of US, 
Japan, and China will neglect the transport costs. From the opening of the Myanmar economy, 
imports from the ASEAN countries would probably reduce suggested by the simulated pattern of 
Myanmar’s imports. T here appears to be a situation in which other ASEAN countries would 
share their benefit to Myanmar to considerable extent.30
Chapter 6
Conclusions
This study researches on an econometric elaboration of Myanmar’s trade structure and its 
prospects towards integration into the international markets. After the collapse of the socialist 
system in 1988, new military government introduced the market oriented economic system and 
enacted Foreign Investment Law. The economy achieved some significant progress within a few 
years; however, the vulnerable political conditions between the opposition group and the military 
government triggered additional sanctions from US and EU year by year. In addition, the hostile 
international pressures have been obstacles for the US and European investors; the strong ties 
with neighboring countries resulted which led Myanmar to heavily rely on disproportionate trade 
and investment patterns with Thailand, China, and ASEAN. The di stortions on the preconditions 
for take-off by the above situations seriously affected the economic and trade structures in which 
Myanmar enjoyed favorable treatment in the form of ODA, FDI and potential export volumes.
The standard gravity  model, with panel  data  of the  period  from  1994  to 2008 and 
econometric tool of Tobit, is employed to explore the trade structure that Myanmar economy 
would continue under the liberalization of trade. A comprehensive structure of the Myanmar’s 
economy and its comparative  advantages would  relocate  its  trade  flows to non-neighboring 
developed and developing countries. In the release of the US trade and investment sanctions, 
specific composition of imports and exports could be channeled to the US, in the expectation of 
transferring high technology and touching the large US markets. Consequently, Myanmar’s trade 
pattern could shift from highly resource-based to manufactured exports under which existing 31
factors of production can be utilized efficiently. Moreover, the trade structure of the ASEAN 
countries  will have  an i mportant change  by  the diversifications of Myanmar’s trade  in the 
international markets; ASEAN’s trade benefits would decrease to some extent with increased 
export competition and reduced imports demand from Myanmar.
The  estimated  models show  many evidences  that  ASEAN  economies  share similar 
determinants of  trade  pattern,  though they  have some differences to  reflect  their  particular 
endowments and location. Nevertheless, predictions for both exports and imports from three-
period models confirm the general results, and reveal the crucial role to trade not only with the 
US but also with Japan. Unless the US sanction is removed and Myanmar political condition is 
stable, Myanmar will continue to experience distorted trade structures and suffer from the lack of 
the most developed countries’ assistance in the form of trade, investment, and ODA.
The implication of the gravity model has a caution. Although the ability of the gravity 
model to predict trade patterns is  strong; in general these  trade patterns  do not  conform  to 
theoretical predictions. These deviations may come from the effects of other extra-economic or 
non-economic factors which have significant impacts on trade patterns; for example, Myanmar’s 
political  ties  with  China and Thailand’s  level of industrialization  with  its  great demand  for 
energy from Myanmar can maintain their trade shares at levels higher than predicted for the 
long-run. Additionally, increase shares of predicted trade with the US and Japan, specifically 
agricultural  ex ports, cannot be  perfectly  operated  si nce  their  agricultural  goods  market  is 
protected by import quotas.
Comparing the predictions of trade volumes among three periods, it may surprise some 
that Myanmar has increasingly emphasized more abnormal trade with nearer few partners; it 32
seems a call  for the policy implications.  Ho wever,  unlike  other  countries, Myanmar’s tr ade 
composition and pattern may not be reshaped by any economic policies; the only requirement is
the decisive feature of political condition.
Asian countries experiences of achieving take-off can be applied as the role strategies for 
Myanmar to escape from deep stagnation. After 1961 military coup by President Park Chung 
Hee,  South  Ko rea  was  able to achieve  the  tremendous  economic  performance.  Likewise, 
although  the  elected  Singapore’s  Prime  Minister  Lee  Ku an  Yew  has been  regarded  as  an 
authoritarian, Singapore is well known for its successful economic growth. It is worth nothing 
that economic performance of nations is not solely dependent on their political structures. No 
matter how South Korea and Singapore developed under the generous American economic aids 
in their early phase of industrialization, the mainspring for the successes of these authoritarian 
regimes is that they could create the general consensus of economic development among their 
own people and interest groups. Although it is more easily said than done, Myanmar must have 
“political commitment to development” along with the quality  of leadership which is able to 
create the social cohesion and political stability essential to achieve sustained economic growth.